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Abstract 
The sale of “green power” (electricity generated using renewable energy sources such 
as wind, solar or geothermal power) to non-residential customers at a premium is one of 
several market-based approaches for supporting renewables. Why would profit-maximizing 
firms or budget-conscious institutions be willing to increase their own costs so as to provide 
environmental improvements which benefit everyone? The literature offers several possible 
motivations, including increasing “green” market share, public image enhancement and pre-
emption of more stringent environmental regulation. This article tests the hypotheses that (1) 
firms and institutions purchasing green power are primarily motivated by the private benefits 
associated with making such a contribution; and (2) participating firms and institutions favor 
voluntary programs over more direct policy approaches to supporting renewables, such as 
taxation. Hypotheses are tested using data from a nationwide mail survey of non-residential 
green power customers. The results of this empirical analysis do not support either of the 
research hypotheses. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Fossil fueled electricity generators are responsible for 72% of domestic SO2 emissions, 
33% of domestic NOx emissions, 33% of domestic mercury and 36% of domestic CO2 emissions 
in the U.S.( Bernow et al., 1998; Carlin, 1997; USEPA, 1997). Emissions from electricity 
generation serve to exacerbate the prevalence of asthma and respiratory disease, regional haze 
and smog, acid-rain related damage and global climate change. If a GWh of electricity is 
generated using renewable technologies, (such as wind turbines or photovoltaic cells) instead of 
Eastern coal, it is estimated that 1.7 tons of SO2, 3 tons of NOx and 1000 tons of CO2 emissions 
can be avoided.1 Changes in the fuel mix used to generate electricity have historically been 
among the most significant variables accounting for shifting emission trends (Schipper et al., 
1996). 
Although the environmental benefits associated with renewable generation technologies 
are widely recognized, fossil fueled generation has always dominated the fuel mix. The 
contribution of non-hydro renewable generation (including solar, wind, geothermal and various 
forms of biomass) accounted for a mere 2.2% of the overall fuel mix in 1999 (EIA, 1999). 
 Generating electricity using renewable technologies has historically been, and 
continues to be, more expensive than fossil fuel alternatives. Although the costs per kWh for 
most renewable technologies have declined dramatically since 1975, costs of conventional 
 
1 These values are derived from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1994) The Impact of Environmental Externality 
Requirements on Renewable Energy. Estimates are likely technology and location specific and are best interpreted 
as indicative of relative damages. 
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generation have also declined such that renewable technologies continue to be more costly 
(Burtaw et al., 1999). Higher renewable generation costs and a failure to internalize the external 
environmental costs associated with fossil fueled generation result in a significant competitive 
market disadvantage for renewable technologies. 
Over the past 25 years, several public policies have been introduced to support the 
development of renewable energy. The sale of “green power” (electricity generated using 
renewable technologies) to retail customers at a premium is one of several market-based policy 
approaches being pursued currently. Traditionally, utilities and green power marketers have 
targeted residential customers. More recently, however, increased attention has focused on non-
residential demand for green power. 
There are a number of reasons why a non-residential customer might decide to purchase a 
premium green energy product. Voluntary participation in environmental programs can (1) 
enhance the appeal of one’s company or institution to “green” consumers; (2) pre-empt future 
environmental regulation and (3) relieve an institution of other, more stringent, regulatory 
obligations (Videras and Alberini, 2000). Here, we include these factors in our analysis. In 
addition, we consider: (4) improving efficiency (Porter and van der Linde, 1995), (5) public 
image enhancement (Konar and Cohen, 1997, Cormier and Magnan, 1999, Khanna et al., 1998); 
(6) employee morale improvement (Smith 1994); and (7) a more philanthropic desire to increase 
the amount of a public good or service provided to society as a whole. 
The principal objective of this research is to evaluate the relative importance of several 
different motivating factors in influencing institutional participation in a voluntary environmental 
program. Given the growing popularity of voluntary approaches to environmental regulation in 
the United States, there has been surprisingly little empirical research done that evaluates what is 
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behind the successes and failures of specific programs. Several authors have endeavored to 
determine what characteristics differentiate those who participate from those who do not (Arora 
and Cason, 1996; Kalweit and Peterson, 1999; Videras and Albernini, 2000; Welch et al., 2000). 
This study takes a different approach, focusing exclusively on those organizations that have 
volunteered to purchase green power and asking why. A better understanding of what motivates 
different types of firms and organizations to participate can shed light on the future potentials 
and limitations of non-residential green power markets specifically, and voluntary environmental 
programs in general.  
A second objective of this work is to investigate the policy preferences of program 
participants. This study evaluates the hypothesis that participating firms will favor voluntary 
programs over more direct policy approaches to support renewables such as taxation, as these 
approaches offer private benefits. 
Hypotheses are tested using data from a nationwide mail survey that explored the 
motivations, experiences and policy preferences of those businesses’ non-profit and public sector 
customers that have voluntarily opted to pay a premium for green power. Our empirical evidence 
indicates that (1) public value oriented motivations play a more significant role than private 
value motivations in driving green power purchasing decisions; and (2) the majority of 
customers surveyed prefers mandatory approaches to supporting renewables. 
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II.  GREEN POWER MARKETING IN CONTEXT: ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
RESTRUCTURING 
 
Green pricing programs, or programs that offer ratepayers the ability to make voluntary 
payments in support of renewables, were introduced in 1993 when utilities first detected a 
willingness to pay for renewables among electricity consumers. Utilities hoped that green pricing 
programs would allow them to experiment with renewable generation without exposing utility 
shareholders to the associated risks (Wiser et al. 2000). Green pricing started small, but as 
market restructuring plans appeared on the radar screen in many states, green marketing was 
increasingly seen as one of the most effective means by which competing suppliers could 
differentiate an otherwise homogeneous product. 
The ongoing restructuring of American electricity markets presents both obstacles and 
opportunities for the further development of renewables. Electricity sector restructuring was 
welcomed by many who anticipated lower costs, increased market efficiency and improved 
customer service. Indeed, it has been issues of consumer choice, market structure and pricing 
that have dominated the restructuring dialogue, with little attention paid to environmental 
impacts.  
On a positive note, there are at least four ways in which restructured markets could favor 
alternative technologies. Increased access to the transmission grid, provided that it comes at 
reasonable cost, could increase access for more remote renewable sources. Restructuring also 
brings a reallocation of environmental regulatory risk, which could induce producers to invest in 
renewable technologies so as to hedge the risks associated with future, more stringent 
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environmental policies. Third, to the extent that consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
electricity generated using renewable sources, retail choice will provide a means for consumers 
to support renewables with their own pocketbooks through the purchase of green power 
products. Finally, higher prices arising from market power in deregulated markets can improve 
the competitive position of renewables. 
On a more negative note, the economics of renewable energy, particularly the high ratio 
of capital to variable costs, can handicap renewables in competitive wholesale markets. In 
anticipating the impacts of industry restructuring, renewable energy advocates feared that lower 
consumer prices would make it increasingly difficult for renewable technologies to compete.2 
Well-documented evidence from California, however, demonstrates that restructuring does not 
inevitably lead to falling wholesale prices. For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this 
paper,3 electricity sector reform has led to significant price increases.  
Although, as noted, one might think that high prices should bode well for renewables, 
this has not been the case in California.4 The increased uncertainty which prevails in restructured 
markets amounts to shorter investment horizons and higher discount rates, neither of which favor 
investment in renewable generation. Infrastructural constraints, delays in payment, corporate 
 
2 In theory, electricity industry restructuring involves a transition from a regulated monopoly (where prices are set 
approximately equal to average cost) to a competitive market (where competition among suppliers should 
theoretically drive consumer prices closer to marginal cost). The expected result is that wholesale prices will fall, 
which could be problematic for renewable generators trying to compete with cheaper, fossil fueled plants. 
 
3 For a concise, well-written review of the factors contributing to California’s energy woes, please see Marcus, 
William and J. Hamrin, “How We Got into the California Energy Crisis,” Center for Resource Solutions, 2001. 
 
4 In California, non-hydro renewable generation at utilities fell by 91% from 1999 to 2000 (EIA 2000. Electric 
Power Monthly, March 2001, Table 13: Electric Utility Net Generation from Other Energy Sources by Census 
Division and State). 
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prejudice against small generators, incomplete information, reduced government support for 
research and development and regulatory uncertainty are all factors which serve to further 
complicate the plight of the renewable generator in a restructured market.  
In a new industrial environment where economic conditions do not favor renewables, the 
question emerges: what to do about renewable energy? In light of consistent public support of 
renewables, many argue that regulatory intervention in restructured markets on behalf of 
renewables is justified (Farhar, 1993; Rader and Norgaard, 1996). Of those 24 states where 
restructuring legislation had been enacted at the time of writing, many have introduced some 
form of renewables support. 
A variety of policy options exist for supporting renewables in restructured markets. In 
states such as Arizona, Maine and Texas, a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) has been 
introduced. This approach mandates that all electricity sellers generate a stipulated and 
increasing percentage of the electricity they sell using renewables. To meet their requirements, 
sellers can either operate their own renewable generation facilities or purchase credits from other 
operators. Delaware, New York and Pennsylvania are among those states that have imposed a 
public benefit charge on all consumers. Revenues from this charge are used to support, among 
other things, renewables development.  In states such as California and Texas, legislators have 
turned to “green power” as a means of financing renewables development. Green power 
programs give consumers the opportunity to support a greater level of investment in renewable 
energy technologies by volunteering to pay a premium on their electricity bills. Green power has 
been referred to as “. . . one of the only bright lights that emerged in response to California 
deregulation law” (CRS, 2001). 
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Although green power suppliers have traditionally focused on residential customers, sales 
to non-residential customers are increasingly important. In 2000, it is estimated that non-
residential customers represented approximately 50% of demand for green power in California 
and 15-20% of demand in Pennsylvania (Wiser et al., 2000; Goett et al., 2000). This apparent 
willingness on the part of  non-residential customers to pay a premium for green power is good 
news for suppliers. Because non-residential accounts tend to be much larger, non-residential 
green power contracts are often more lucrative for providers, as compared to residential 
purchases. Furthermore, when a high profile organization or corporation purchases green power, 
public awareness of the product is heightened. 
This voluntary approach to supporting renewables is not entirely new. Over the past 
decade, non-mandatory pollution prevention programs that rely on the ability of firms to profit 
from voluntary environmental initiatives have increasingly been endorsed by government and 
adopted by regulatory agencies. Since 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency has 
developed more than 12 programs wherein socially desirable outcomes are facilitated through 
government encouragement of voluntary actions, to be undertaken by participants based on their 
own self-interest (McCarthy, 1995). Growing enthusiasm for voluntary approaches is associated 
with a concomitant increase in both theoretical and empirical analysis of these programs. 
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III.  A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FIRM PARTICIPATION IN 
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS5 
 
When fossil fueled generation is offset by increased use of more costly renewable 
generation, the environmental benefits accruing from the avoided emissions are enjoyed by 
everyone, regardless of whether they purchased green power. The “green” attributes associated 
with green power can thus be thought of as a kind of public good.  
The majority of non-residential customers who have elected to purchase green power are 
paying a premium on their electricity costs. Assuming the decision to purchase green power is a 
rational one, these organizations must believe that the costs associated with purchasing green 
power are outweighed by the benefits. The emerging empirical and theoretical literature on what 
motivates firms to exceed environmental regulations has identified a number of explanations for 
the phenomenon of voluntary participation. In particular, attention has thus far focused on four 
(non-exclusive) motivations: 
A.  Efficiency Gains 
Industrial ecology and related literature in corporate environmentalism stress that – in 
many instances – voluntary pollution reduction can be accompanied by higher resource 
productivity or improved product quality, particularly in an industrial or manufacturing context. 
In such circumstances, firms’ voluntary contributions to a healthier environment may be 
 
5 This section is based on a literature review which appears in a previous paper: Wiser, W., M. Fowlie and E. Holt. 
“Public goods and private interests: understanding non-residential demand for green power,” forthcoming in Energy 
Policy. 
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motivated by cost minimization concerns (e.g. Lober, 1998; Monty, 1991; O’Rourke et al., 1996; 
Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Romm, 1994 ; Walleye and Whitehead, 1994).  
B.  Reduced Regulatory Risk 
A growing body of literature considers an organization’s decision to volunteer as an 
attempt to pre-empt or affect the design of more stringent environmental regulation (Barrett, 
1991; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Sergeson and Miceli, 1998; Videras and Alberini, 2000). 
In theory, firms voluntarily commit to environmental improvement with the underlying objective 
of either achieving reductions in regulatory scrutiny – possibly in an area unrelated to the 
voluntary activity – or influencing the scope of the regulations to provide competitive advantage 
to the firm. Although some researchers separate the pre-emption of future regulation and seeking 
relief from current regulatory obligations as two distinct motivations (Videras and Alberini, 
2000), this study considers the general desire to affect regulation via voluntary action as a single 
concept. 
C.  Green Marketing 
With high levels of environmental concern among consumers and an ever increasing 
number of green products entering the market, a third important potential motivation for 
voluntary environmental commitments is the desire to differentiate products based on their 
environmental attributes and thereby gain new customers and build the loyalty of existing ones 
through green marketing (Arora and Gangopadyay, 1995; Kirchhoff, 2000; Ottman and Reilly, 
1997).  
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D.  Public Image Enhancement 
Closely related to green marketing considerations are more general attempts by 
organizations to manage the public perception of their environmental performance (Arora and 
Cason, 1996). While it is difficult to assign a precise monetary value to a good reputation, it is 
nevertheless perceived by both public and private sector organizations as being important to 
maintain. Perhaps the most tangible economic gains (and losses) associated with a firm’s 
reputation have been documented by changes in capital market valuations resulting from 
environmental disclosures  (Austin, 1998; Khanna et al., 1998; Konar and Cohen 1997).  
Existing literature has focused principally on some of the largest firms in the U.S. 
economy, and the importance of each of these four motivations is premised on the belief that 
corporate environmentalism will only be successful if organizations believe that they will 
directly benefit from the resources they devote to improved environmental performance. Because 
the sample considered in this study included many small firms (much smaller than those 
typically considered in the existing literature) two additional motivations – not previously 
emphasized in the existing literature – could prove significant. 
E.  Improved Employee Morale 
Some organizations may derive value from and therefore be motivated by improving 
employee morale and enhancing their ability to recruit top-rated college graduates. Though 
relatively little emphasis has been placed on this motivation in empirical work, improving 
employee morale through enhanced environmental performance has been identified in case 
studies and surveys as possibly an important motivator ( Fri, 1992;  Henriques and Sadorsky, 
1996; Smith, 1994).  
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F.  Public Value 
Finally, some organizations may simply be motivated by good will, driven by a benevolent 
desire to maintain their civic responsibility and a strong organizational commitment to the 
environment rather than solely by economic gain. In studies of the voluntary environmental 
contributions of individuals and of interest group participation more broadly, altruistic 
motivations are frequently mentioned as being a key motivator (e.g.  Knoke, 1988; Vining et al., 
1992). Less attention has been paid, however, to the potential role of good will in the decision 
making of non-residential customers generally, and businesses in particular (Weaver, 1996). 
Altruism as a key motivation is dismissed by some observers of corporate environmentalism (Fri, 
1992). Traditional models of firm behavior assume a profit-maximizing firm that cares little for 
purely altruistic investments. Despite a dearth of empirical evidence, an altruistic concern for the 
environment was included in this study as a potentially significant motivating factor.  
Through both direct and indirect questioning, this study seeks to explore the relative 
importance of these motivations in the purchasing decisions of our respondents. 
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IV.  AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS  
TO A PUBLIC GOOD 
 
Andreoni (1990) was one of the first to introduce a generalization of the standard public 
goods model that accounted for the private benefits associated with contributing to public goods. 
The model is similar to more conventional public goods models insofar as it is based on 
individual utility as a function of the consumption of private and public goods. The model differs 
significantly in its implication that an individual’s private donation has utility and properties as a 
private good that are independent of its public good properties. 
 Building on Andreoni’s work, Cornes and Sandler (1996) take a slightly different 
approach and cast the mixed public goods problem entirely in terms of characteristics. A 
consumer’s preferences are represented by the continuous utility function: 6 
(1) Ui [ X(xi), Y (Σy), Z (yi) ], 
where xi is the quantity of the private good purchased by consumer i, yi is the quantity of the 
public good purchased by consumer i and Σy is the total quantity of public good provided by all 
consumers. Consumption of a unit of the private good (x) generates one unit of characteristic X 
for the consumer. Consumption of the public good (y) jointly generates Y, a public 
characteristic, (the total quantity of which is a function of the sum of all contributions, Σ yi), and 
Z, a private characteristic, (the total quantity of which depends on the individual’s contribution, 
yi). A purchase of one unit of the public good produces α units of Y and β units of Z. α and β are 
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exogenously determined coefficients that reflect the simple process by which Y and Z are 
generated through contributing to the public good in question. 
The preceding review of the literature suggests that, in the case of a firm participating in 
a voluntary program, a disproportionate share of the utility derived from the voluntary 
contribution made by the firm may be private in nature: 
(2) Ui (α yi) < Ui (β yi ) 
where Ui (α yi) represents the utility derived from the public benefits resulting from one’s own 
contribution and Ui (β yi ) represents the utility derived from the private benefits resulting from a 
voluntary contribution. This study tests this hypothesis using data from a survey of firms 
purchasing green power. 
If non-residential purchasers of green power are more strongly motivated by the private 
benefits (such as marketing benefits and/or the pre-emption of regulation) than by the 
environmental benefits accruing to society as a whole, one would expect respondents to indicate 
a preference for voluntary approaches to supporting renewable energy. After all, these private 
benefits cannot be as easily captured under mandatory regulation. 
In theory, a firm will prefer voluntary regulation if : 
(3) Ui (β yi)  > Ui (YMP – YVP),  
where Ui (YMP – YVP) represents the utility derived from consumption of the additional 
public good provided under a mandatory regime that would not have been provided under a 
voluntary regime. Although this inequality is difficult to evaluate directly, a testable hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 The Cornes and Sandler model is restated here using different and somewhat simplified terminology. 
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is simply that firms more motivated by private benefits will be more likely to prefer voluntary 
programs. 
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V.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper presents the results of the first large-sample mail survey of non-residential green 
power customers in the U.S. The target population was non-residential customers (businesses, 
public sector institutions and non-profit organizations) paying a premium for green power. The 
sample population was compiled with the cooperation of regulated utilities and competitive 
marketers offering green power products. The two largest competitive green marketers agreed to 
participate in the survey by providing customer contact information, as did five regulated utilities 
that were known to have the largest number of non-residential customer sign-ups.  
Geographically, the sample is diverse, containing customers from the competitive markets of 
California and Pennsylvania and from regulated markets in Oregon, California, Wisconsin, and 
Colorado.   
The entire sample population consists of 1,800 customers, each of whom received the 
mail questionnaire in the spring of 2000. A follow-up reminder and additional copy of the 
questionnaire were sent to non-respondents of the initial mailing.  The survey instrument 
included questions pertaining to motivation, policy preferences, product and supplier selection 
criteria and market barriers. Due to the limited follow-up procedures and the sample population 
(business customers), a low response rate was expected. 464 completed surveys were returned. 
Given the low response rate to the survey, non-response and selection biases are expected 
to be especially prevalent. Consequently, the extent to which survey findings can be generalized 
to the sample population, much less to the overall target population, is limited.  The target 
population is small and is limited by the incipient state of the green power market. Accordingly, 
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it is difficult to generalize the experiences of these “early adopters” to the larger potential market 
for green power among non-residential customers. An additional methodological challenge is the 
common problem of hypothetical bias. To increase the robustness of the findings, issues 
pertaining to the central objectives of the study were addressed through several lines of 
questioning, and the consistency of the responses to these related questions was analyzed.  
 
 
VI.  DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
A. Profiling the Respondents 
Eighty-two percent of the survey respondents represent businesses. Of those businesses, 
82% classified themselves as retail, with the remaining 18% falling into the “wholesale or 
industrial/manufacturing” category. Fourteen percent of respondents represent non-profit 
organizations, while the remaining 4% represent public sector organizations. When asked about 
organization size, 57.5% of respondents classified their institutions as “small,” with less than 
$0.5M in annual revenues or budget and 31.6% classified their institution as medium-sized, with 
revenues or budgets between $0.5M-$10M. The remaining 10.9% fell into the “large” category, 
reporting revenues or annual budgets larger than $10M.  
Eighty percent of respondents reported annual electricity expenditures of less than the 
national average of $8,226.7 Several respondents have sizable electricity expenditures, however, 
resulting in a mean annual electricity expenditure among respondents of $88,000, well above the 
 
7  Energy Information Administration Form EIA-861, “Annual Electric Utility Report, 1998.” 
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national average. Sixty-nine percent of respondents indicate that green power is costing them 
more than other available options, while 24% report it costs about the same and 6% believe it is 
costing them less.  
Those customers reporting a discount can be divided into two groups:  
(1)  Some respondents, reported receiving a discount when in fact they are paying a 
premium for their green power product. (Each survey was numbered to indicate the respondent’s 
marketer or utility. In some cases, a respondent reported receiving a discount from a provider 
that only sold green products at a premium).  
(2)  Because of subsidy programs in California, some marketers have been able to offer 
green power products at a discount. Although efforts were made to exclude from our sample 
those California customers who are able to take advantage of the subsidy, it is possible that some 
remained in the sample.  
The unweighted average reported green premium, including respondents who reported 
receiving a discount, is 8.4%. The average premium paid per dollar of electricity expenditures in 
the sample is 1.2%, weighted downward considerably by the presence of a few large firms 
paying small percentage premiums.  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship observed between 
organization size and premium. 
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FIGURE 1 
Average Annual Premium by Organization Size 
 
 
 
B. Motivations 
Survey respondents were asked to indicate the importance of several different 
considerations which influenced their organization’s decision to purchase green power (5-point 
scale; 1 = not important, 5 = very important). Table 2 presents the wording used to distinguish 
the possible motivations. Figure 2 presents the results. Neither efficiency gains nor a reduction of 
regulatory risk are ranked highly by respondents. Despite the emphasis of the literature on these 
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0 
5000 
10000 
15000 
20000 
25000 
<$.5M $.5M-$10M $10M-
$100M 
>$100M 
Size Category 
$ 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
% 
Premium ($) 
Premium (%) 
 20 
would the purchase of green power have an obvious influence on the fate of future regulatory 
action, particularly where small firms are concerned. 
 
TABLE 1 
Summary of Potential Motivations for Purchasing Green Power 
Theoretical Motivation  Survey Description of Motivation 
Efficiency Gains Lowest Cost:  
Green power is our cheapest electricity option 
Public Image Enhancement Public Image of Our Organization:  
Maintaining a “green” public image is important to us. 
 
Green Marketing 
Catering to Environmentally-Conscious Consumers:  
It is important that we accommodate the needs and 
concerns of our customers, shareholders or constituents 
Organizational Values:  
Our organization feels a strong and pervasive 
commitment to public health and the environment. 
 
Public Value 
Civic Responsibility:  
We feel a responsibility to be community leaders, not 
just for the environment 
 
Improved Employee Morale 
Employee Morale:  
Employees feel more pride in an organization that is 
giving back to the environment. 
 
Reduced Regulatory Risk 
Reduced Risk of Future Environmental Regulation: 
Our voluntary actions in support of renewable energy 
reduce the need for further government intervention 
and regulation. 
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Figure 2 
Ranking of Motivations for Purchasing Green Power 
(1 = not important, 5 = very important) 
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“strongly agreed” that “going green” would increase customer loyalty; most did not believe that 
their customers care if they improve environmental performance (Kalweit and Peterson, 1999). 
In the second study, several large companies indicated that even if they purchased all the green 
power their utility had to offer, they would be unlikely to gain any public relations benefits as a 
result (Mayer et al., 1999). 
As organizations can be expected to exaggerate the importance of altruistic concerns as 
compared to profit-maximizing motivations, some effort was made to contrast stated motivation 
with reported behavior. Respondents were asked if they had engaged in or had plans to engage in 
any number of activities to “get the word out” about their green power purchase. These activities 
included (1) educating employees about green power; (2) developing point-of-sale marketing or 
public education material about their purchases; (3) issuing press releases about their purchases; 
(4) mentioning green power purchases in reports to shareholders, members or stakeholders. If 
non-altruistic concerns were in fact the principal motivators in purchasing decisions, one would 
expect that respondents would have engaged in several of these activities. 
With the exception of employee outreach, little secondary marketing has taken place. 
Forty-eight percent indicated that they had educated employees about their green power 
purchases or had plans to do so. Eighty percent had no plans to do any point-of-sale marketing, 
86% had no intention of issuing a press release and 82% had no plans to mention purchases in 
reports to stakeholders. Secondary marketing efforts were found to be significantly more 
prevalent among those institutions that indicated they were more motivated by image and 
marketing concerns. These results support the finding that in this sample more altruistic motives 
were a principal driver behind green power purchases, followed by employee morale. 
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In an effort to gain insight into the more general motivational structure underlying 
purchasing decisions, a factor analysis of the rankings of the several motivations evaluated was 
conducted using orthogonal (varimax) rotation.8 There appear to be two broad patterns of stated 
motivations to purchase green power: one encompassing more altruistic motives and a second 
oriented more towards private economic benefits. Consistent with a preliminary correlation 
analysis,9 results from the factor analysis confirm that motivations are organized around two 
relatively unique factors which together account for 45% of the variation in all variables. Table 2 
lists the factor loadings, communalities and variance accounted for by each factor. 
The “organizational value” and “civic responsibility” rank variables load heavily on the 
first factor. With the weightings so similar, the rankings of these two motivations (which range 
from 1-5) are summed to calculate a public value index score (ranging from 1-10), represented 
by ρ in later analysis. This variable ρ is highly correlated with factor 1 scores (r = .97). In theory, 
the observed variable ρ is a manifestation of Ui (α yi), or the utility derived from the public 
benefits associated with the public good one has purchased.  
The second factor contains only two items with high loadings, namely the public image 
enhancement and green marketing considerations. Because the loadings of these two criteria on 
the second factor are so similar, (.77 and .75), the ranks of these two criteria (ranging from 1-5 
respectively) are summed to obtain a private value index score (with values between 1-10), 
 
8 “Factor analysis” refers to a family of statistical techniques concerned with the reduction of a set of observable 
variables in terms of a small number of latent factors. Variables that are highly correlated with one another are 
grouped to form factors, which, it is hoped, will adequately summarize the original variables. The procedure has 
been developed primarily for analyzing relationships among a number of measurable entities (such as survey items). 
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represented by φ in later analysis. This variable φ is highly correlated with factor 2 scores 
 (r = .96). The observed variable φ is, in theory, a manifestation of Ui (βyi), or the utility derived 
from the private benefits associated with making a contribution of yi to the public good. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Factor Loadings and Explained Variances: Current Customers 
Motivations Factor 1 Factor 2 Communality 
Lower Costs * * .23 
Public Image * .77 .63 
Green Marketing * .75 .62 
Organizational Values .78 * .61 
Civic Responsibility .72 * .54 
Employee Morale .49 .41 .41 
Reduced Regulatory Risk * * .12 
Total Variance Explained 22.6% 22.5% 45.1% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The Pearsonian correlation matrix indicates high correlation between the green marketing and public image 
variables (r=0.64) and between the civic responsibility and organizational value variables (r=0.57). The employee 
morale variable is significantly correlated with all four of these variables (with all four correlation coefficients ≥0.4). 
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Of all motivations considered, lower costs and reduced regulatory risk have the lowest 
communalities, indicating that they are not uniquely related to either factor. Employee morale 
loaded on both factors, suggesting that this variable contains both public and private value 
components. 
If we can assume that there is a high degree of correlation between the importance an 
institution attributes to a particular type of motivation and the value it derives from the benefits 
associated with that motivation, the empirical evidence presented here does not support our first 
hypothesis. Recall, it was initially hypothesized that, for the average institutional decision maker, 
Ui (α yi) < Ui (β yi ). 
If we can  treat ρi and φI as proxies for Ui (α yi) and Ui (β yi) respectively, the evidence 
does not support this hypothesis. Survey results indicate that the majority of respondents derive 
more utility from the public good component of their contribution than from the private value 
component. Private value index scores (φI) exceed public value index scores (ρI)  for only 10% of 
the sample, while φI < ρI  for 65% of respondents. 
Within this sample, smaller firms were less likely to stress the importance of public 
image and green marketing considerations than were larger firms.10 It is possible that the 
predominance of good will as a primary motivation behind the green purchasing decisions of this  
 
10 Linear regression analysis of the variance in the private value index variable was carried out. Results of the 
analysis suggest that, ceteris paribus, larger institutions are more likely to be motivated by image and marketing 
concerns than smaller institutions. The regression coefficient for the size variable is positive and statistically 
significant. Other dependent variables included in the model include institution type (public sector/non-profit/for 
profit), customer type (utility or marketer), size of premium, environmental convictions of patrons and the extent to 
which the respondent believes green power purchases can be used strategically. For a more complete discussion of 
this analysis, see Wiser et al., (2000). 
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customer sample can be explained, at least in part, by the small size of the majority of 
institutions responding to the survey. Past studies that have stressed the importance of the private 
benefits associated with participation in voluntary environmental programs have tended to focus 
on larger firms (Arora and Cason, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Welch et al., 2000).  It may 
be that good will is a much more influential motivator among small organizations that are trying 
to strike a balance between business and personal motives. 
C. Policy Preferences 
When asked about their policy preferences, the majority of green power customers 
responding to the survey indicated they preferred mandatory public policy measures to voluntary 
approaches. Table 3 presents the wording used in the survey to describe four alternative means of 
supporting renewable energy development. Respondents were asked to indicate on a 5-point 
scale the extent to which they supported the different alternatives, (1 = do not support; 5 = 
strongly support). 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of Alternative Policy Approaches to Supporting Renewable Technologies 
 
Policy Approach Survey Description 
Public Benefits Charge “All electricity consumers should pay a little more for their 
electricity in order to raise funds to finance renewable energy 
products.” 
Renewable Portfolio Standard “All utilities and/or power suppliers should be required to 
include a minimum percentage of renewable energy in their 
supply portfolios.” 
Pollutant Tax “Pollution from electricity generation should be taxed or further 
regulated.” 
Voluntary Programs “Support for renewables should come from voluntary consumer 
choice.” 
 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the findings. The portfolio standard was the most strongly supported 
of the options, with a mean response of 4.2, followed by a pollutant tax (3.9) and a system-
benefit charge (3.5). Among respondents, a voluntary approach to supporting renewable 
generation is the least preferred alternative with a sample mean of 3.1. 
 3 
FIGURE 3 
Ranking of Policy Approaches to Supporting Renewables 
(1 = do not support, 5 = strongly support) 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to better evaluate the relationship between policy preferences and motivation, 
responses to the policy preference question were recoded such that respondents were placed in 
one of three preference categories: (1) strictly prefer voluntary programs to all mandatory 
regulation; (2) strictly prefer at least one mandatory approach to voluntary regulation;  (3) rank 
voluntary and mandatory approaches equally. Only 12% of respondents indicated that they 
preferred voluntary approaches to all other alternatives; 61% preferred at least one regulatory 
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alternative to a voluntary approach; and 27% indicated that voluntary programs were their least 
preferred approach for supporting renewables.  
As shown in Table 4, respondents were also categorized with respect to their stated 
motivations. Those respondents who had high public value index scores (ρ > 8) and low private 
value index scores (φi < 4) were classified as pure altruists. Impure altruists had high scores for 
both the public and private value indices (ρi > 8 and φi > 7).  Respondents who had low public 
value index scores (ρi < 4) and high private value index scores (φi >8) were classified as purely 
self-interested.  
 
TABLE 4 
Stated Motivation Categories 
Motivation Category Public Value Index Score (ρ) Private Value Index Score (φ) 
Pure Altruist ρ >8 φ <4 
Impure Altruist ρ >8 φ >7 
Purely Self-Interested ρ <4 φ >8 
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A chi-square statistic was calculated to test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship 
between a respondent’s  policy preference category and motivation category. The cross-
tabulation of these two variables is presented in Table 5.  The calculated chi-square statistic for a 
goodness of fit test with df =,4 is 7.01, which is not significant at the 10% level. Consequently, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no significant evidence to suggest that customers 
with higher private value index scores are more likely to favor voluntary regulation.  
 
TABLE 5 
Cross-Tabulation of Preference Orderings and Motivation 
 Policy Preference Category 
Actual value (expected value under H0) 
 Prefer 
Mandatory 
 
Neutral 
Prefer 
Voluntary 
 
Overall 
Pure Altruist 66 (59) 26  (26) 5  (11)  97 
(22%) 
Impure Altruist 202 (207) 91 (91) 45  (40) 338 
(76%) 
Purely Self-
Interested 
4  (6) 3  (2) 2  (1) 9 
(2%) 
Overall 272 
(61%) 
120 
(27%) 
52 
(12%) 
444 
(100%) 
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research investigates both the motivations and policy preferences of non-residential 
consumers of green power. Customer motivations appear to be organized around two relatively 
unique factors: one which measures the degree to which a firm’s purchase is made in the public 
interest, and another which measures the extent to which a firm is concerned with green 
marketing or image enhancement. The majority of survey respondents de-emphasize public 
image, marketing and regulatory pre-emption concerns and stress the importance of motivations 
which load heavily on the “public value” factor. With the majority of respondents reporting that 
they have made few, if any, efforts to publicize their green power purchases, reported behavior 
seems consistent with stated motivations. 
The findings that (1) the public value associated with increasing renewable generation 
capacity is a principal motivator for current non-residential green power purchases, and (2)  non-
residential customers are apparently receiving little material private value from their 
contributions suggest that voluntary approaches are limited in terms of the support they can offer 
renewable energy resource development.11  If suppliers are unable to credibly offer private 
rewards along with their green power products, non-residential green power demand is likely to 
be limited to the extent that benevolence guides institutional decision-making.  
 
11 This implication stands in contrast to Arora and Cason (1996), who conclude that voluntary environmental 
initiatives may hold great promise because the largest firms with the most toxic releases are more likely to 
participate in a toxic reduction program. 
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With regards to policy preferences, a majority of survey respondents prefer mandatory 
regulation to voluntary approaches for supporting renewables. There is no evidence that 
customers more motivated by marketing and image considerations are more likely to favor 
voluntary programs. With only 12% preferring voluntary programs to mandatory regulation, the 
following appears to be true of our sample: 
Ui (θ yi)   ≤ Ui (YMP – YVP). 
In other words, the utility derived from the private benefits associated with purchasing 
green power does not exceed the utility which would have been derived from the additional 
renewable generation that would have been provided under mandatory regulation where 
everyone is obliged to contribute. This assumes that levels of public good provision would be 
higher under mandatory regulation. These findings can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either 
policy preferences are simply not a function of the private value accruing from voluntary 
contributions, or the private benefits reaped by survey respondents rarely reach the point at 
which they outweigh Ui (YMP – YVP).  
Because the findings of this study are based on a small sample of customers, we cannot 
assume that the motivations and policy preferences found in this sample are typical of the entire 
population of non-residential customers. This work offers only preliminary support for two 
alternative hypotheses, namely that non-residential participation in green power purchasing is 
primarily motivated by benevolence, and that a majority of respondents favor mandatory 
regulation in support of renewables. 
It is estimated that in the spring of 2000, approximately 66% of residential green power 
consumers resided in California (similar estimates for non-residential consumers were 
unavailable, but are assumed to be comparable) (Wiser et al., 2000). Recent developments in the 
California markets have since forced most green power providers to close shop and return their 
 8 
California customers to default service providers who purchase from predominantly fossil-fueled 
generators or large hydro sources (Green-e, 2001). Empirical evidence presented in this paper 
suggests that future non-residential demand for green power could be very limited. The 
confluence of limited demand and unstable market infrastructure suggest that the goal of 
increasing the share of renewables in the fuel mix is best achieved using good, old-fashioned, 
mandatory regulation. 
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